Tag Archives: masculinity

VAUSH ON THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FUTURE OF YOUNG MEN

Screenshot from TRNN

POSTED IN POLITICS AND MOVEMENTS: US

The popular streamer explains the appeal of streaming as a new form of political media and what it tells us about masculinity in the internet age.

BY TAYA GRAHAM AND STEPHEN JANIS NOVEMBER 3, 2023 (therealnews.com)

Screenshot from TRNN

The media environment morphs with dizzying speed year after year, and the rise of political streamers is just the latest arc of the digital age. How do we explain the rise of streamers in the context of rising inequality and atomization? And what do we make of the popularity of many such streamers among a predominately male audience? Popular Twitch streamer and libertarian socialist Ian ‘Vaush’ Kochinski joins Taya Graham and Stephen Janis for a special discussion.

Studio Production / Post-Production: David Hebden


TRANSCRIPT

The following is a rushed transcript and may contain errors. A proofread version will be made available as soon as possible.

Taya Graham:

Hello, everyone. My name is Taya Graham, and welcome back to The Inequality Watch, a show where we examine how corporate elites manufacture inequality, and weaponize it against us. Why do we call the show the Inequality Watch? Well, it’s for a pretty simple reason. There is no greater existential threat to our supposed democracy, or life on this planet, than the unjust enrichment of the few at the expense of the rest of us.

This extreme and unprecedented wealth leads to an unhealthy imbalance of power and opportunity. The result is an economic and political system warped by the naked theft of both our political and physical resources on a vibrant planet that should belong to all of us, but instead, ends up in the hands of a corrupt few. Part of the reason that we can and do report on this is because we’re independent media, right, Stephen?

Stephen Janis:

Yeah. The tentacles of inequality run deep and my mainstream media counterparts often have to answer to them. Fortunately for us at The Real News, we don’t. So we can hopefully give you actual truth and objective reality.

Taya Graham:

You’re right, Stephen. The mainstream media often avoids challenging these powerful interests. No, not individual politicians, but the real power, the dark money that warps our political processes. Where do you turn? Where do you go to find news, information, and commentary that’s untainted by establishment politics and corporate interests? Well, could a video game streaming service be the next frontier of a new political movement? Could young progressives be shaping future policy positions while playing Dark Souls or Baldur’s Gate?

Well, that’s actually a distinct possibility. And why? Well, partly because of the work of my next guest. His name is Ian Kochinski, but he’s better known as Vaush, and he’s at the vanguard of what’s commonly called the Debate Bro Movement. His work is why we are taking a slightly different approach for today’s show. We’re starting on a series of reports on new media, and investigating a cultural phenomena that he is a part of.

It’s a sphere of fierce political debate, where some of the youngest voters go to learn and discuss the best policies and politics to save and prosper our nation. Where is this gladiators’ arena? Well, although I discovered it on YouTube, it initially evolved on Twitch. What is Twitch? Well, for the uninitiated, like myself, it’s primarily a streaming website for gamers, where they share their love of eSports. But like most social media, it has evolved to reflect the concerns of our day. In an era of a global pandemic, a worldwide economic crisis, and a surge in social unrest and political division, finding a space to break down and understand the shifting sands of today’s politics is happening more and more in these online communities, and are needed now more than ever.

To understand these new political communities, and the movements they’re fostering, I delved into what’s known as the realm of the Debate Bros. Young folks, often, but not exclusively men, who step into the arena to fight for their ideals in politics, philosophy, and ethics. To understand this world better, of course, I had to call in one of the reigning champions, Vaush.

Vaush:

I can’t precisely do that. I’d have to run you through specific scenarios in which it fails to make my argument.

Stephen Janis:

What’s your political ascription?

Vaush:

I’d say left liberal, for the most part.

Stephen Janis:

Damn. All right. Why are you punching left, comrade? What’s up?

Destiny:

All I’m saying is that one of the biggest ways you can control your budget is to control the place that you live in. And that sometimes if you’re a poor person, sometimes moving to a different area can be a good way of managing your budget. That’s all I’m saying. Is there anything there that you disagree with?

Vaush:

Yeah, that sometimes the costs associated with moving are substantial and they can prevent people from moving, especially if you’re disabled or have a family.

Destiny:

Okay.

Vaush:

Yeah, substantially so. You do realize the entire video that I have just watched, of yours, is a screed of arguments you would’ve argued against two years ago? Some of these arguments are riddled with survivorship bias, some of them sound very similar to arguments [inaudible 00:03:53].

Destiny:

You’re going way over course. So if you’re like a fucking disabled war veteran with a family of 27 or whatever, and you [inaudible 00:03:58]-

Vaush:

No, no, no, no, no. If you’re a regular, one of the many Americans who lives paycheck to paycheck or can’t afford a $300 emergency, not if you’re a disabled war veteran with 87 children who [inaudible 00:04:10].

Destiny:

If you can’t afford anything in your life, then how are you going to affording your current rent?

Vaush:

What? Because moving is an additional cost, because you added to the existing cost.

Destiny:

[inaudible 00:04:16] and you’d be saving money after moving, you’d move to someplace cheaper.

Vaush:

You don’t know. Destiny, you don’t know anything about me.

Destiny:

[inaudible 00:04:23]. Mr. Mom and Dad paid… Mr. Mommy and Daddy paid for your school. I promise you I know more than you about this. [inaudible 00:04:27].

Vaush:

Then respond to the arguments rather than characterizing what I have to say.

The landlord can’t just walk away unless he’s able to sell the property. He is tied to that property. The renter is not so much wait.

Stephen Janis:

As a homeowner, again, I don’t have a problem with homeowner and I don’t have a problem with property management, I have a problem with landlords.

Vaush:

You don’t have to rent.

Stephen Janis:

Wait, wait. What can you do? Wait. What’s the alternative between renting and owning a house?

Vaush:

No, I’m saying the alternative to being a renter is to buy a property.

Stephen Janis:

So that’s what I was saying. The only way out of this exploitative system is to have an enormous amount of money that most people don’t have access to. You should look up Portugal and their drug policies. Freedom makes societies better, just a better place to live for everyone.

Taya Graham:

Well, figuratively punching Nazis or admonishing impractical or intractable leftists, Vaush is a libertarian socialist. His edgy humor and no holds bards fights for his ideals often leave him somewhat alienated from his leftist comrades, feared and despised by the alt-right, but still beloved by his audience of over half a million subscribers combined. Please welcome to this episode of the Inequality Watch Vaush.

Vaush:

Hello.

Taya Graham:

Vaush, it’s great to have you. Thank you so much for joining me.

Stephen Janis:

Welcome to our show.

Taya Graham:

Join thousands of others who rely on our journalism to navigate complex issues, uncover hidden truths, and challenge the status quo with our free newsletter, delivered straight to your inbox twice a week:

How did you carve out this particular niche? How did you start streaming gaming and debating? Can you walk me through it? How did it go from just playing video games and chatting to this very substantial political debate?

Vaush:

Well, I’ve liked live-streaming as a format for about as long as it’s existed technologically and since basically its inception. Initially it was mostly a gaming thing. I think that live-streaming mostly started out with Korean eSports players, broadcasting like StarCraft matches, going way back. But very, very quickly, it was evident to a lot of people, this was a medium that was pretty revolutionary. The ability for a person to interact in real time with an audience was pretty unmatched in basically any other mass media format. So invariably it was going to become a medium for political discussion, and I wanted in on that.

I think that there’s something very authentic and engaging about being able to do this in a very live quick, easy format. We’re entering an era of populism. More and more so people are distrustful and discontented with who they see as suited politicians, the class of politicians. And live-streaming is innately, if not authentic, at the very least, somewhat populous because you have to be there live, you have to respond and engage live. It’s disarming, it’s personable, and I think it’s endemic to the era. So I’m happy to be here.

Taya Graham:

How would you describe what you do? I would categorize you as part of a new leftist media ecosystem, but how would you describe your work and its goals?

Vaush:

I have a tendency to play down what I do. After all, it is largely live-streaming and YouTubing, it’s not anywhere near as rote and professional as, I guess, what a lot of people who believe what I believe would’ve done in the past. But really it’s just the modern version of pamphleteering or running radio shows, in a day-to-Day sense practically. I mean, at my computer right now, it’s a very informal job with very low professional standards, which I like, both because it’s incredibly personally convenient and also because I think it’s better representative of what it is we’re trying to do. It does away with a lot of ostentatiousness and respectability politics that are otherwise really common to entry level political engagement.

Not having to deal with that, being able to just talk about what I want just to sit here and engage freely, I like that, and I think the audience likes it too. I think it breaks down what would otherwise be a uncomfortable barrier of professionalism.

Stephen Janis:

Did I make a mistake by wearing a tie to this interview, or should I take my tie off at this point?

Vaush:

I think you look great in it personally.

Stephen Janis:

Okay, thanks.

Taya Graham:

You need to break down those barriers. You know what? I have to say though, I have found your conversations with both American and Canadian Nazis fascinating. Let’s take a look at a clip.

Vaush:

Walk over here. Holy shit, you’re losing it. Just move on with the white nationalist ethnostate thing. So let’s say, the moral argument would be that I don’t think it’s okay to say that a person can’t live in a neighborhood or country because of their race. That would be my argument.

Speaker 1:

It’s fighting against the thought that in X amount of years, whites are going to go extinct. And we perhaps, and again, this is imaginative, there’s so much overlapping with societal, cultural, moral claim. I think it would benefit the people of America to have some separation, have some breathing there.

Vaush:

How would it benefit us? How do I benefit from this?

Speaker 1:

There’s going to be less right wing voters in the voting demographics, in the electoral. So right away, you’re going to be better situated to win elections for the left. I know you’re not necessarily a Biden supporter.

Vaush:

Sure.

Speaker 1:

And as a nice guy, white nationalist, I favor secession over civil war and eternal fighting.

Vaush:

If we’re talking pragmatics though, then the easiest thing that I could do is grant you territory in the heartland of America, starve you out with the blockade, deny you airspace in the surrounding area, wait for you all to starve, retake my territory, and now I have 1 million less fascists in my country. If we’re talking pragmatics, the easiest thing that I could do would not be to your benefit. You’re asking to be left alone, which is not something that I’d be willing to do purely because it benefits my voting demographics. If you’re making that argument, why do you deserve this? What’s so wrong with living in America?

Taya Graham:

So what I’ve noticed is that you really take the time to tease out their belief systems and then challenge them. What benefit do you think this brings to your audience?

Vaush:

Well, I think this is something that is very particular to live-streaming. Far right politics has always been about dog whistles and euphemisms. You can’t just go online or I guess in any format really, and just scream the N-word. I guess you can, but it’s not very politically effective. Usually you have to bury it under a bunch of associative issues. Donald Trump represented the death of many euphemisms, but even in his case, there is still a layer of civility and mutual respectability he has to upkeep. The case with live-streaming is that very often people who represent far right values can’t actually keep it in that well. It’s very difficult for them, I almost sympathize, to accurately reflect and describe their politics in a way that doesn’t completely give the game away. So you have to tease out those values, you don’t want to argue what they want to argue because what they want to argue is a substitute for what they actually believe.

It’s like getting into, if you could analogize it back to the 1960s, getting into a big argument about, I don’t know, forced busing, or school rights, or something, when in reality you’re talking about race. You want to focus on what people are actually thinking about, otherwise you’re just shadow-boxing and you don’t want to do that.

Stephen Janis:

I’ve noticed Vaush in your comment section, even in the way just watching your videos, that a lot of times you’re in the process of deradicalizing young men. Can you talk about that process? Because it seems so potent and we’ll talk about more about the right radicalization process. But how do you go about that? How do you approach that? Because it’s so hard, I think as people get programmed on YouTube, how do you kind of confront that, or otherwise try to help people with that?

Vaush:

Well, I think that people fall down those pipelines really quickly these days. Maybe they always have, but it’s more visible now than ever.

Stephen Janis:

I agree.

Vaush:

It simplifies, and it’s weird too, because you think, you just casually like a 14-year-old boy in high school, it’s like, “Here’s my Nazi phase,” or whatever. It’s surreal. I don’t like it. I don’t like the fact that that’s what we deal with, but it’s deliberate, it’s targeted. Steve Bannon spoke extensively about his efforts to reach out to sexually insecure young men and convince them that far right politics were the answer to the issues, like the incel problem.

This is targeted. Deradicalizing, trying to show people that maybe they shouldn’t be 14-year-old Nazis or whatever, at any age or position they have to be at, it’s vital. There is a tendency with some left-leaning people to write-off some groups as lost, that there are some groups of people like, “Why bother with them?” And while I don’t think disproportionate time and energy should be spent, I don’t think we should all commit ourselves entirely to the project of fixing this one white boy or whatever. At the very least, it’s something worth thinking about. And the fact that we keep seeing these recurring cycles of reactionary thought propagated by people appealing to young men, Andrew Tate, Jordan Peterson, clearly this is something worth attention. We don’t want to be caught unawares here.

Stephen Janis:

What do you think makes young men so vulnerable to this? Taya and I always talk about this sentence that he started watching YouTube videos and it never ends well.

Taya Graham:

Exactly.

Stephen Janis:

What do you think makes young men so vulnerable to this kind of… I don’t want to say propaganda, but this type of line of thinking that puts them down the rabbit holes that you’re trying to pull them out of?

Vaush:

Honestly, I think it’s just sexual insecurity. Often unwarranted sexual insecurity, oftentimes held by young men who have not even been old enough… They haven’t been alive long enough to have any real reasons to be sexually insecure. I think that fascism tends to stem from that. Even if you go back to 120-

Stephen Janis:

That’s deep.

Vaush:

Like the Jim Crow days, right? These propagated myths of white insecurity against Black men. What would they do-

Taya Graham:

That’s a good point.

Vaush:

The lynchings they did. There would be castration, accusations of rape or sexual assault. There’s this fear of impotence, it seems, that’s reflected in a lot of this propagandizing, and young people are just really insecure. They’re pretty vulnerable to that just by virtue of being young and stupid. It’s like a messy subject, but it’s worth paying attention to.

Stephen Janis:

Yeah, because you had Senator Josh Holly writing a book on masculinity, and you see polls that say that young men tend to be less liberal than young women. It really seems like the right has said, “If we can profit, or if we can somehow exploit that security you’re talking about we can build a larger coalition of young men who will vote for us.” Is that what you see happening with people like Josh Hawley going, saying, “I’m going to define masculinity.”

Vaush:

Yeah, for sure. The right is very, very, very worried about young people because young people are so disproportionately liberal. Look at Vivek Ramaswamy talking about raising the voting age to 25 or whatever. And the demographics show this, young people will be the death of the Republican Party unless something changes, and they know that. So how do you convince these people? Well, in an age of populism and distrust, young people aren’t going to be moved over with these bow tie libertarian arguments anymore. The Ben Shapiro era of young people being motivated by some snobby intellectualism or pseudo intellectualism, I don’t think that’s as prominent anymore.

Ben Shapiro gets picked on by his other daily wild cohorts quite often, the more openly fascist ones. I think now it’s all about the big guns. It’s insecurity, racial politics, sexual politics, get them young when they’re stupid and easy to give narratives to. “That girl you liked didn’t give you any attention? That’s actually because feminism has ruined modern women. You notice that a cool Black guy who plays basketball, he’s getting a lot of attention, you’re not? That’s because racial politics promoted by the left, which is actually promoted by Jews, is convincing young women that they need to be more like…” Shit like that, you know? It sounds crazy, but that is legitimately the narrative that gets pushed in a lot of cases. And 14 year olds are dumb, so that’s a demographic you can push for.

Taya Graham:

And I just wanted to follow up by saying that there are certain neoconservative reactionaries, influencers even, that have gone out of their way to capture the hearts and minds of these young men. And I notice that often in your conversations with… You have a very male audience in general, I hope I’m not misspeaking, it seems like you have a lot of men in your audience-

Vaush:

For sure.

Taya Graham:

… you give them advice and insights into dating, and how to be a good ally, and how to talk to women, what consent is, how to get enthusiastic consent. Why do you think one of the extreme right wing’s goals is hooking young men in the area of dating and relationships, and what do you think the left could or should be doing?

Vaush:

I think that people, especially young people, are very self-interested when it comes to the ideologies they hop on board with. If a good pitch is given to them, they’re more likely to go with it. It’s what benefits them. The left has strong messages of empowerment for young women. If you’re a young woman and you listen to the left attitude on what young woman are and should be, you’re going to hear a lot about freedom, you’re going to hear a lot about empowerment. It’s not always good all the time, but I think for the most part, there’s a pretty strong positive message. Whereas with men, there’s a mixed narrative of it’s not that men are bad, it’s that let’s be real here, men are dangerous. And on the left, that gets promoted often. And if you’re like a 14-year-old boy and you hear that, that’s not really… You hear a message from the left and it’s like, “well, what should I do to be a left-leaning person? How should I be a progressive?”

And it’s like, “Well, you have to check your privilege.” It’s like, that’s not bad. I’m not saying that’s a bad message. I’m saying that it’s a bad onboarding message for your average guy. So the right comes in and they’re like, “No, no, no, no, no, no, you don’t need to change a thing. In fact, you are being held back by the media, by the narrative, by feminists.” They give a much more compelling message. So I try to match that. I think there are lots of ways to promote empowerment and confidence without playing into those tropes.

Stephen Janis:

How do you really craft a message to young men that’s an alternative to the idea of just check your privilege. Do you have any methodology you use or any sort of examples or just if you don’t mind exploring that, because it’s fascinating.

Vaush:

Yeah. Well, I think a lot of it is just about the appropriate ways to channel confidence. A lot of the advice people give for being confident is not that, it’s actually an advice for covering up insecurity. You see this a lot with Andrew Tate style stuff where it’s like, the solution to being insecure is actually to be this monstrous force where you demand or intimidate or otherwise project strength onto others to compensate for a genuine lack of competence in yourself. And the left response, which I think is often very lacking, is, “No, no, no, no, no. Don’t do any of that. In fact, be smaller, take up less space. If you’re a guy, you already take up a lot of space, so take up less space.” And again, is there value to that? To an extent, sure, we can talk about it, but bad messaging. I think that promoting healthy confidence, the idea that the left shouldn’t be afraid of talking about stuff like dating advice, they’re like, “Well, what is it?”

Realistically, give dating advice to a young guy. A lot of left-leaning people can’t because it gets locked up in this performative PSA talk about the importance of being respectful and not being a misogynist or whatever, which is good, but it’s not holistic, it’s not the whole message, and it doesn’t teach people everything they need to know. They miss out on a lot. I guess that’s the main thing I try to focus on. What slips in the gaps? What insecurities does the right pretend to fix and can you actually fix them? What evidence really touches on that?

Taya Graham:

That’s really interesting, and I actually hate to veer the conversation from the direction we were taking, but you made a statement recently that really stood out to me, and I think it was in a conversation with a documentary filmmaker working on a piece about the Seven Mountains Christian Project. And you said What we need to focus on is not necessarily critiquing Democrats, or liberals, or progressives, but fighting the fascist impulse in our country. And I took that to mean essentially that there can be common ground found with Republicans, or Democrats, or libertarians, or moderates, but that the fascist impulse would co-opt everything we cherish. Can you elaborate a little bit on that?

Vaush:

Yeah. Ultimately, from a left-leaning perspective, if fascism wins, it’s over. It’s done. We see this happen in other countries, there’s no two words about it, they’ll kill us. They will kill us. We’ll all be in mass graves. By we, I mean any kind of remotely left-leaning figure, any visible queer sexual minorities, these groups are done. So their victory cannot happen. I think that there are good and bad ways to do coalition building against that. The bad way is what the Democrats want you to do, which is this, “The Republicans are really bad and they’re so bad that you can’t criticize us, because we’re so much better than them. So fall in the line because we’re the best option you have, and if you criticize us, you’re actually helping them.” And I think that this is the very cynical way that liberals try to placate progressive or socialist critiques of their political strategies in the face of fascism.

The good way is, I think, more of a tactical alliance. What can liberals help on specifically and at what point is undermining them to a more progressive and actually beneficial? I think that’s a really difficult thread to weave. It’s really difficult to find a good balance there. And the frustration I have, I guess, is that it seems like a lot of people just can’t have that conversation. There are people who are very ideologically motivated to despise the Democrats to the point where they downplay the threat fascist pose. And then there are people who think that the fascists aren’t really that much of a threat, so it’s unnecessary to oppose the Democrats meaningfully for that reason. It’s such a mess.

And you see flavors of this all over the left’s face, people argue amongst themselves constantly. I personally side with anything in terms of coalition building is justifiable if it means keeping the fascist from winning, and as long as that need has been met, it’s free game. Any dissident behavior outside of that purview is acceptable, but you can’t compromise the fascism thing. Because, man, it’s like with Biden, right? I don’t want Biden to be the democratic front-runner for 2024. I’m not happy about that, but he is. That’s a fact. And I don’t think Trump should win. So you do what you can.

Stephen Janis:

What do you think is the root of the fascist impulse in this country? Because we grapple this a lot in our coverage of policing across the country, but what’s the root, why is fascism so hard to root out in this country? Why does it seem to be so stubborn?

Vaush:

I think that in a way, fascism is like politics without politics, or politics by other means. It’s a way of supplanting political thought in favor of a frenzy drive that is of course political, it’s fully political, but it’s a way of masking those broader intentions. I think that Republicans are fastidiously pro-corporate. They’re more pro-corporate than Dems are, on average, though, of course, both are corporate parties.

Stephen Janis:

True.

Vaush:

And I think that as is often the case with reactionary pro-corporate parties, the Republicans realize that people are getting less and less amenable to trickle down economic bullshit, because nobody believes that crap anymore. Even Republicans don’t really. The voters, no one buys that. So how do you get people to vote Republican if all the economic arguments are bunk, completely discredited? Well, you have to get them the reactionary angle. But if you go too far down the reactionary angle, people stop promoting reactionary politics for the sake of corporate politics, and instead go the other direction where they promote pro-corporate politics secondarily, and the reactionary impulse becomes the norm.

And that’s, I think, where the tipping point towards fascism really hits on. And right now you take a look at the discourse with the far right in this country, and it’s insane, genuinely psychotic every day. It’s like, “What’s the new culture war talking point? Let me watch this episode of Sesame Street because a prominent senator called it the downfall of the West or something. Here’s a clothing company that released an item for the binding trans men’s breasts or something. Now I need to do research to find out whether or not this person was substantiated and say that it was actually designed by a pedophile in 1973.” It is so disconnected from reality that it’s farcical, but it’s unfortunately also the battlefield and the right has always been better at setting the stage for that. So we just have to deal with it and learn the arguments.

Stephen Janis:

And also, as Taya said at the beginning of the show, we talked about inequality, the show deals with inequality, and how much is the inequality in our country, which makes so many things impossible, like healthcare for all and other things, how much is that driving the simplistic solutions of fascism? You’re saying, “The country can’t take care of me.” We were just talking about how Narcan spent seven or eight years not being easily accessible because of the greed of the company. And when you see a system fail like that, doesn’t that make it easier to make the fascist argument in some ways?

Continue reading VAUSH ON THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FUTURE OF YOUNG MEN

The Crisis Over American Manhood Is Really Code for Something Else

Male malaise in the United States goes back to the founders, and it is a preoccupation of elites in particular. They might teach us something about this current wave of manliness panic.

Illustration of a skull with circles of various imagery around it: books, religous iconography, a man in a suit, ink blots, men fighting, a man weightlifting and tree textures.

Illustration by Nicole Natri for POLITICO

By VIRGINIA HEFFERNAN

07/14/2023 04:30 AM EDT (politico.com)

Virginia Heffernan is author of Magic and Loss: The Internet as Art.

On opening night of the Stronger Men’s Conference in Springfield, Missouri, in April, an Army tank squatted incongruously on a church chancel. Not one of the pastors, sports figures or niche Christian influencers who sermonized about masculinity throughout the well-attended event, which was a literal come-to-Jesus affair with a power-ballad band and pep talks, remarked on it. Presumably the tank stood for the masculine virtue of lethality. Or maybe rigid defensiveness.

Other totems of virility, including Motocross champions, Fight Club references and a formal prize for densest chest hair, were on hand like citronella candles to shoo away gay vibes. To a crowd that looked all-male, Pastor Levi Lusko, a former porn addict, unfurled a highly disturbing sermon on how much he loves sex. He cited an old lyric by T-Pain and Flo Rida to explain Eve’s allure to Adam: Apple bottom jeans, boots with the fur.

But in spite of this camp machismo signaling, none of the speakers opened culture-war fire. Talk of politics was scant, even when Republican Senator Josh Hawley of Missouri, one of the featured speakers, took the stage.

Hawley committed to the bit. The senator, whose book Manhood: The Masculine Virtues America Needs came out shortly after the conference, can preach. On the morning of the conference’s second day, in a neo-televangelical Hillsong style, Hawley delivered a bona fide sermon enjoining men to find their purpose. His reading of Judges even took some clever turns, identifying — as some evangelicals do — a “pre-incarnate Jesus” in the Old Testament. No matter what worldly troubles the guys were facing, Hawley assured them, they each had a divine calling: to become mighty men of valor.

With homespun anecdotes about farming and marriage, Hawley also managed, for a time, to curb his trademark Stanford-Yale pomposity. He was no doubt playing to the audience of churchgoing men in Springfield. He skipped the suit and the sneer. And he called out, almost persuasively, to his blue-collar relatives: “My cousin Jordan, who’s an electrician, and my cousin Aaron, who’s a builder!”

Pretty soon, though, Hawley was into lamentations — about the rates of mental illness, drug abuse and, especially, suicide among young men without college degrees. “This is a generation that is living increasingly without purpose or place, without meaning, without direction.” At top volume, he summarized: “It is the calamity of our age that so few men feel a sense of purpose anymore!”

Hawley, a graduate of Stanford University and Yale Law School, is hardly the first white man with hyper-elite credentials to express worry about his gender. Concerns about American masculinity go back to the beginning of the country, to John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, and have been a particular fixation of the ruling class.

THE MASCULINITY ISSUE

THE CRISIS OVER AMERICAN MANHOOD IS REALLY CODE FOR SOMETHING ELSE | BY VIRGINIA HEFFERNAN

DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS AGREE MEN ARE IN TROUBLE. THEY DISAGREE ON WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT. | BY KATIE FOSSETT

PORTRAIT OF THE MODERN AMERICAN MAN — IN NURSE’S SCRUBS | BY KATHY GILSINAN

HOW BRONZE AGE PERVERT BUILT A TWITTER FOLLOWING AND INJECTED ANTI-DEMOCRACY, PRO-MEN IDEAS INTO THE GOP | BY ROSIE GRAY

DEMOCRATS HAVE A MAN PROBLEM. THESE EXPERTS HAVE IDEAS FOR FIXING IT.

But in one crucial way, Hawley is different from his predecessors. Before Hawley, masculinist philosophers tended to locate the calamity of manhood among the overly refined, the gentlemen in their hard collars and high hats. These pretty boys, they believed, desperately needed time on horseback or football fields to put hair on their chests. These days, elites like Hawley see a crisis among the proletariat. It’s an unexpected flip-flop, as workers and farmers, whom Hawley now faults for a lack of virility, were once the honest, plain-talking family men whose manliness was held up as exemplary to neurotic snobs.

Why doesn’t Hawley take his pitch to elites? He didn’t respond to a request for an interview on the topic, but perhaps it’s because men without college educations are much more imperiled by mental illness, addiction and suicidality than college-educated men. They’re less contented. They’re less employed. And, for Hawley, that means they’re a riper political target — more easily sold on far-right memes and “woke”-bashing flexes as a way to cure what ails them.

Marvin Rohrbach, a farmer, stands outside on his land, as seen through a window, with antlers and other objects on the window sill inside.
Marvin Rohrbach, a farmer, stands across from his land in Kingdom City, Mo., on March 16, 2023. | Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images

When Hawley calls working-man woe “male malaise,” he’s got to be the first to use that fey French word of the Carter era to designate a problem-that-has-no-name among burly electricians and builders. But if he intends to make common cause with them, he must continue to style himself, somehow, as one of them — albeit the fully-realized, highest-end, zillion-threadcount version.

But, though Hawley is marketing his masculinity crisis to a new audience, his arguments draw substantially on those of the white, rich, Ivy League-educated pundits who came before him. In reviewing the history of American manhood, it’s astounding to discover how long masculinity has been framed as “in crisis”; in the telling of these writers, it’s never not been in crisis. From the 18th-century elite to Hawley and his conservative confrères, the project of defining and protecting American “manhood” doubles as a way to define and protect some obscure American essence — and these men, whether in wartime or peacetime, whether in traditional or untraditional societies, cannot stop worrying that they’re losing their authority over it.

Circle cutout featuring illustrations of a man in a suit and a pen and inkwell.

In the 18th century, the French writer J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur framed American manhood as an open question: “What, then, is the American, this new man?”

The new man was implicitly contrasted with the old. When they first arrived, European settlers, aware that they were unequipped to face the continent’s terrain and its indigenous inhabitants, were quick to define themselves against their own Europeanness. Europe, by contrast, was cast as an effeminate place, identified with dandyism, decadence, and incompetence. But depending on which part of the America-Europe distinction a man emphasized, his philosophy of masculinity could be the Adams type, or the Hamilton one.

Adams Masculinity was the version of American manliness proposed by President John Adams in 1797, when he sought to designate Hercules as the nation’s avatar because the demi-god son of Zeus chose domestic virtue over sexual pleasure. Adams Masculinity frowns on tomcatting and affairs. I’ve come to think of Hawley’s version of manhood as Adams Masculinity.

Meanwhile, its opposite, Hamilton Masculinity, which is also Trump Masculinity, is good with tomcatting and affairs. In an open letter published in October, 1800, Hamilton described Adams as blundering, ignorant, vain, and jealous. For his part, Adams wrote in an 1806 letter to a friend that Hamilton suffered from “a superabundance of secretions which he could not find whores enough to draw off.” Each thought he was the manlier man.

John Adams, Gouverneur Morris, Alexander Hamilton, and Thomas Jefferson sitting around a table.
John Adams (far left) and Alexander Hamilton (center right) with Gouverneur Morris (center left) and Thomas Jefferson (far right). In an open letter published in October 1800, Hamilton described Adams as blundering, ignorant, vain, and jealous. | Augustus Tholey via the Library of Congress

The argument for Adams Masculinity says that Europeans are parlor flirts who carelessly scatter their seed, while American men dutifully commit to family life. The argument for Hamilton Masculinity says that European aristocrats are anemic and sexless, while American men have high libido and animal spirits.

The masculinity crisis flared up again 50 years later. The mid-19th century was a period of almost incalculable social upheaval. As the historian Joshua Zeitz pointed out to me, many independent farmers became tenant farmers in these decades, just as artisans became factory employees. The rise of the middle class, especially in the cities, represented the decline of manual labor in favor of office work. The Wall Street lawyer who narrates Herman Melville’s “Bartleby, the Scrivener” (1853) deprecates himself as “eminently safe” in temperament. He supervises a “singular set of men” — nerdy Wall Street notaries — who are defined by their submissiveness.

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No wonder writers for America’s rapidly proliferating newspapers, working desk jobs themselves, created a new genre, of which Manhood is the latest example: Worrying in print about the possibility that men had lost their edge. One such writer was Walt Whitman, who in 1858, beset by his own neurasthenic dizzy spells, wrote a series of masculinity-crisis columns for the New York Atlas called “Manly Health and Training.” Whitman condemned illicit sex and excessive drinking and shuddered at the pervasiveness of “that dreary, sickening, unmanly lassitude, that, to so many men, fills up and curses what ought to be the best years of their lives.” Male malaise.

Whitman wrote his column in the years before the Civil War. But after the war, surviving men, suffering from disfigurement, disability, and mental disorders, once again decided their problem was emasculation. John Pemberton, a morphine-addicted Confederate colonel who had been gored with a saber, addressed that new period of male malaise by inventing cocaine-laced Coca-Cola as “a cure for all nervous affections” in troubled vets, notably impotence.

Left: Two Union soldiers from the American Civil War sitting on a bench, with their arms around each other. Right: A Civil War soldier with one leg seated in a chair while holding a guitar.
“After the Civil War, surviving men, suffering from disfigurement, disability, and mental disorders, once again decided their problem was emasculation,” writes Virginia Heffernan. | Library of Congress

Then came the generation born after the Civil War, who devised their very own crisis of manhood. They didn’t have war trauma or lost limbs, true, but — they now mourned — nor had they had a chance to be battle-tested. “War hawks in the 1890s tended to be men like Teddy Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, who were born too late to earn their manhood in war,” Zeitz told me. “Civil War veterans like William McKinley, on the other hand, were far less eager to go to war with Spain. They had seen enough combat.” (In his masterwork of alarmist homoeroticism, the documentary short “The End of Men,” the Fox News host-turned-Twitter personality Tucker Carlson quotes the post-apocalyptic novelist G. Michael Hopf on a war-peace masculinity cycle: “Hard times create strong men, strong men create good times, good times create weak men, and weak men create hard times.”)

Manhood at Harvard, Kim Townsend’s 1996 intellectual history of turn-of-the-century manliness at the university, chronicles the way academics created a post-war masculine ideal. These Ivy Leaguers, especially the philosopher William James, ardently felt the need to justify — and redeem — their cushy existences.

While Teddy Roosevelt thought only combat could make a man, James argued that it was possible to “continue the manliness to which the military mind clings” without actually going to war. One way was to simulate the trials of combat and hard labor, which these Harvard men felt they had shamefully failed to endure, with college sports and extensive time in the gym. Townsend quotes a document by the head of the college gym, who believed that strenuous workouts could cure all social ills, and even save the Republic by subduing the “great mental and moral disturbances which sometimes threaten the stability of a government.” In novels of the period and thereafter, such as The Octopus by Frank Norris and A Lost Lady by Willa Cather, robust men with a passion for the West denigrate coastal Americans who cling to high Victorian style and customs, a practice that later became known as owning the libs.

Around the same time, in 1902, Albert Bushnell Hart, a broad-minded Harvard historian and mentor of W.E.B. Du Bois, published an essay on masculinity in something called Harvard Graduates’ Magazine. “Harvard Manhood” was the first of many 20th-century essays to claim widespread emasculation as a preoccupation of ruling-class American men. Like Hawley, Hart believed that men were being emasculated by their own selfish pursuit of trivial pleasures.

“The trait which most impresses itself upon the teacher,” Hart wrote, “is the readiness of Harvard youths to be amused: life seems to them a continuous performance, in which college lectures are only a ‘turn.’” The result: “growing disorder in the classrooms.” (Hawley reprises this elegiac tone in Manhood: “Everywhere in our society we see men … prioritizing their entertainment or pleasure, withdrawing from responsibility. The result is the same for us as it was for Adam in the garden: disorder, decline, dysfunction.”)

Several Harvard students, dressed in costumes, walking down a street.
Harvard fraternity men are pictured in an undated photo. “Ivy Leaguers, especially the philosopher William James, ardently felt the need to justify — and redeem — their cushy existences,” writes Heffernan. | Bain News Service via the Library of Congress
A black and white landscape of Memorial Hall on the Harvard campus, with a horse-drawn carriage in the foreground.
Memorial Hall at Harvard circa 1900. Albert Bushnell Hart’s “Harvard Manhood” was the first of many 20th-century essays to claim widespread emasculation as a preoccupation of ruling-class American men. | Detroit Publishing Company via the Library of Congress
An overhead view of male Harvard students sitting at rows of tables during a meal.
Students sit in the Randall Hall dining room at Harvard in 1901. “In novels of the period and thereafter robust men with a passion for the West denigrate coastal Americans who cling to high Victorian style and customs,” writes Heffernan. | B. L. Singley via the Library of Congress

Hart wrote this essay more than a century ago, and as a result, he had nothing to say on the problems that haunt masculinity-crisis books today: feminists, video games, puberty-blockers, pronouns, Priuses. Harvard in Hart’s day was populated almost entirely by pious white men with nice big birthrights, and it should have been paradise for the proto-anti-“woke.” So where did Hart see a crisis in the midst of Harvard’s manly bounty?

In demographic change, it turns out. “In the class of 1875, 135 of the 141 graduates had unmistakable English names, and three of the remainder were probably of English-speaking families,” he wrote. “In the class of 1902 are to be found numbers of Germans, Irishmen, and Scandinavians.”

Swedes and Scots. Blond men and sandy-haired men. Making matters worse, according to Hart, “Slavs and Latins” —Jews and Catholics, in other words — were also elbowing their way in, along with a disturbingly large number of hayseed students from families with “small tradition of intellectual life.” And then there was DuBois, one of the first few Black students at Harvard — and his favorite. Hart concluded: There is no longer a Harvard man, but Harvard men.

Townsend nails the problem pluralism presented to Harvard’s male students. The “diversity of peoples with whom [Harvard men] had to compete” was daunting at the time, he writes, because the bar for young men suddenly seemed to be set impossibly high by the new students. There used to be a few law firms in Boston and New York to work in, and maybe the Senate to run for or a family firm to run. Now, at newly diverse Harvard, there were, as Townsend puts it, too many “worlds that could be conquered.”

The new pluralism was also at odds with the singular male ideals inherited from antiquity and the Bible: Achilles the warrior, Jesus Christ the martyr, and Plato the intellectual. How could you have a Jew aspiring to be Jesus, or a hayseed with Platonic ambitions? This was “the sadness of the situation of young males,” according to Townsend.

Without a unified paradigm to shoot for, elite men seemingly lost focus. But Hart, in the end, doesn’t sew up his argument because he can’t. Just like Whitman in 1858, who found a masculinity crisis in men who eat potatoes, and Pemberton, in 1886, who found a masculinity crisis in men coming home from war, Hart finds the forever crisis in Harvard WASPs who share classrooms with Irish classmates.

Somehow, just about every time elite American men look at virtually any sociological change, they see a crisis of masculinity. Hawley has taken this reflex one step further — perceiving the end of men not in his milieu, but in the social class of his cousins and his fellow Springfield residents, the men who are in despair and without purpose, having been deceived by liberal atheist dogma even as they failed to make it to Palo Alto or New Haven.

Circle cutout from main illustration featuring an illustration of a rosary and two men fighting

The path back to manliness is often through religion. It is for Hawley, who enjoined the Missouri crowd to reconnect with Jesus, and it was for the conservative intellectual William F. Buckley in the middle of the last century.

In 1951, the longstanding conviction among elites that a terrible nationwide castration is underway showed up again in Buckley’s God and Man at Yale, his polemical memoir about his college years. In it, Buckley worried that Yale men of the 1940s were exposed to so much religious skepticism and collectivist economics that they’d lost their red-bloodedness.

He conjured an image of the unlettered forty-niners of 100 years before who deserted their wives and children to head out West and, in the mid-century American myth, build the nation with their bare hands.

These eccentric lone-wolf entrepreneurs, who might have paid for sex a time or two, have been libertarian exemplars ever since. While a family man himself, Buckley surely knew that the swashbuckling 49ers were not going to stay celibate; to idolize single thrill-seekers was to go all in for Hamilton Masculinity.

A group of male California gold miners gathered around equipment, with a gold frame around the image.
California gold miners, circa 1850-1852. In his 1951 memoir, William Buckley conjured an image of the unlettered forty-niners of 100 years before who deserted their wives and children to head out West and, in the mid-century American myth, build the nation with their bare hands. | George H. Johnson via Wikimedia Commons

The book became a bestseller, largely because it claimed that Yalies, good men and true, were being undermined by a proto-“woke” faculty that was not whole-hearted about Christianity or capitalism. Again, these newcomers were a threat to the established order — and elite masculinity was the only bulwark against the sweeping changes they represented.

One of Buckley’s professors gently mocked the Communion wafer as short on hemoglobin, and thus perhaps not the real flesh of Jesus Christ. Others dared to advocate for a higher tax rate than Buckley approved of, and thus struck him as communists. Not to believe in God was unmanly, Buckley believed, as atheists were considered charmless and spindly nerds. But not to believe in unfettered capitalism was worse. It was to advocate for shackles on spirited young men who needed to be allowed to flex their muscles and seek their fortunes.

Buckley’s insistence that it’s unmanly to advocate for government investment or the economic ideas of John Maynard Keynes persists among right-wing elites. It is especially strong in the conservative Harvard historian Niall Ferguson, who once slagged Keynes as “effete,” adding that Keynes was indifferent to the future because he was gay and childless. (Ferguson later apologized.)

If hating Keynes is still in the mix for manly conservatives, so is full-throated Christianity. Hawley claims in his sermon in Springfield that he formally accepted Jesus as his personal savior at five, in 1984, while on his father’s knee.

Hawley also grew up in Missouri, just as male blue-collar work was in steep decline. As the historian Kristin Kobes Du Mez explains in her book Jesus and John Wayne, construction, manufacturing and agriculture shrunk from around half the workforce in the 1960s to less than 30 percent by the end of the 1990s, when Hawley was a student at a Jesuit boys’ prep school in Kansas City, MO. By the time Hawley graduated from high school, “the male breadwinner economy was largely a thing of the past,” Du Mez told me.

While Hawley was at Stanford, attending classes on a campus where women would soon outnumber men, churches in the midwest turned their attention to masculinity as a spiritual — if not economic — state. “Stripped of their confidence as providers,” Du Mez told me, “men compensated by turning to the ‘protector’ role. But there is a performative quality to this. Calls for the restoration of ‘traditional’ masculinity are often infused with a sense of resentment over what was lost.” Hawley in Manhood insists on both providing and protecting: “To protect and provide are obligations laid upon husbands from time immemorial.”

Hawley typically cites Big Tech, Hollywood and academia as the unholy trinity of elites that has laid masculinity to waste. He likes to quote the titles of old feminist essays from obscure journals to imply that all college professors and all Democratic politicians hate men. But even as he blames this ruling-class syndicate for depriving men of their ancient reason for being, his own fears sync with ruling-class fears from time immemorial. Elite men are anxious that their wives, workers and children will gain financial and intellectual independence, take their property and flee. And then the unkindest cut: Someone new — a lowly outsider who has been waiting in the wings — will take their place at the top of the social order.

Circle Cutout featuring Harvard and Yale pennants.

For those who, like me, attended the Stronger Men’s Conference online, at a whopping $119 per ticket, Pastor Greg Krowitz and Pastor Tyler Binkley, emcees of the cloth who looked like Rod and Todd Flanders after two decades of tanning and kettlebells, opened the event by hyping God as if he were a UFC champ. The prime directive of Greg and Tyler was evidently to yawp with enthusiasm for the “life-changing” event.

It became clear that the conference would deliver on life-transformation only if it made strong pious men out of impious weak non-men. If I didn’t hear a celebration of Trump-style machismo at SMC, I did see potential for coercion or fraud. SMC’s larger vision of manhood, after all, is that it exists entirely in a solid, tithing commitment to a church, ideally James River, which hosted the conference.

Seen this way, the conference was a hit to the degree that it produced a parade of dramatic conversions — a series of men full-throatedly renouncing their wicked or flaccid ways, and firmly recommitting to Jesus, the megachurch and next year’s conference. To get those theatrical and ultimately lucrative conversions, the conference exerted max pressure to whip men into a frenzy, even as intoxicants and curse words were banished. The use of fiery displays, erotic language, loud exhortations to “Wake up and lead like it matters,” and Christian stadium rock with industrial, Stomp-like effects — HAIL HAIL LION OF JUDAH — could rouse even the least manly nervous systems.

What do men want? After the conference ended and I finished reading Manhood, men remained an enigma. That old riddle deepens with the revelation, in Townsend’s book, that the word “masculinity” was only coined in 1890, and that, before that, “manhood” meant something like “humanity.” Being virtuous (from “vir,” meaning man) meant simply being humane. Perhaps masculine virtues like courage, honesty, and respect are just … virtues.

A tattered American flag waving in the foreground, with power lines and a cloudy sky behind it.
An American flag is seen in Bloomfield, Mo. in March. Sen. Josh Hawley grew up in Missouri, just as male blue-collar work was in steep decline. | Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images

If so, it’s no more convincing to fault unemployment or failures of social services for a social catastrophe — as the more left-leaning Richard Reeves does in his 2022 book, Of Boys and Men — than it is to fault porn and feminism, as the right does.

Pundits of every stripe are inclined to point out inchoate cultural convulsions like “crises in masculinity” to tee up attacks on their enemies and to harp on what bothers them most about modern life. The men at the Stronger Men Conference focus mightily on the Book of Genesis. Maybe, to these guys, it will always be Eve, and the porn featuring her apple bottom, that caused men to fall from grace.

For the rest of us, the source is harder to pinpoint. Americans, in all of our dizzying ideological and cultural diversity, are always anxious to nail down a self-definition. Being 336.7 million people without a national language or religion, of whom only 9.7 million have indigenous ties to the land, evidently just doesn’t cut it when you’re looking for an identity. So some people find a tight bond in their maleness, even while the definition of manhood stays always in flux.

Bushwhacking through the thicket of these circular arguments is, in the end, highly unpleasant. While masculinity philosophers aim to project supreme confidence, their terms slip and slide. An undefined catastrophe is always in the offing, though the evidence for the crisis keeps changing.

From almost the moment they arrived, American men of European descent have taken pains to pretend they belonged here, that this country was theirs, that they’d been here all along. Perhaps that’s why male elites, bent on seeming powerful and somehow “native” to America, tend to romanticize the parts of America that are least like Europe — the plains, the ranches, the Appalachians, the Ozarks. But somehow, at a certain age, they also keep heading like moths to a flame to Cambridge, New Haven and Palo Alto, where, around the broad oak seminar tables, they can all agree that, while the rest of their classmates are ivory tower sissies, they themselves are rough riders at heart.

The Strong, Silent Type

A young, shirtless boy in a darkened room with light from slightly opened blinds looks down. His face and upper torso are awash in shadow and light.

© Anitra Lavanhar

THE SUN INTERVIEW

Jaclyn A. Siegel On Masculinity And Male Body Image

BY SAM RISAK • MARCH 2023 (thesunmagazine.org)

Women are pushing back against the unrealistic body ideals that have long dominated American society, speaking out about discriminatory, fatphobic “norms” and sharing stories about related eating disorders. Such conversations still have a long way to go, but they are at least being had. This is not the case among men.

Social psychologist Jaclyn A. Siegel was pursuing her master’s degree at Villanova University in the mid-2010s, researching how workplace environments can support or hinder eating-disorder onset, maintenance, and recovery, when she noticed that little information existed on eating disorders in men. This research gap encouraged Siegel to study the issue as she worked toward her PhD at the University of Western Ontario. Concentrating on the intersection of gender and eating disorders, she published research on topics like self-objectification, body-based social comparisons, body shame, and father-daughter communication about body image. Her current research focuses on the effects eating disorders have on intimate relationships.

At the age of twenty-six, Siegel became a postdoctoral research scholar with the San Diego State Research Foundation. She continues to serve there as project director of the Pride Body Project, an NIH-funded clinical trial of an eating-disorder prevention program for individuals who identify as men and are gay or bisexual, or experience sexual attraction to men. Siegel is also an adjunct professor at San Diego State University, teaching classes on the psychology of human sexual behavior. She sits on the editorial boards for five academic journals — Body ImagePsychology of Women QuarterlyPsychology of Men & MasculinitiesFrontiers in Social Psychology (Gender, Sexuality, and Relationships), and Sex Roles — and is the style editor and social-media coordinator for Psychology of Women Quarterly.

Over video calls, Siegel and I discussed how traditional masculinity in the U.S. leads to a certain male body ideal, which has contributed to eating disorders, body-image dissatisfaction, and muscle-dysmorphic disorders in individuals across sexual and gender identities. These issues are compounded by a lack of awareness and research, and in Siegel’s view the field has a lot of room to grow. Ultimately, though, she sees the problem as not with men themselves, but with patriarchal structures that are harmful to society in general. The solution, she says, is to expand our definition of masculinity, and thus expand men’s potential.

Risak: How do you define masculinity?

Siegel: I would describe masculinity as a set of stereotypes about what is “normal” for men. Masculinity is socially constructed, and being seen as a “real man” in the eyes of others is a precarious undertaking. In societies marked by gender inequality, where traditional gender roles are rewarded or socially mandatory, many men feel that they must regularly engage in behaviors consistent with these norms to be perceived as sufficiently masculine and thus avoid stigma, discrimination, and sometimes even violence.

We often talk about “toxic masculinity,” but, in reality, masculinity is multifaceted and contains many beautiful elements. It appears in different ways in different cultures and in different eras.

Risak: How do we typically evaluate masculinity in the United States today?

Siegel: In 2003 James R. Mahalik and colleagues published the Conformity to Masculine Norms Inventory, a psychological inventory we use for evaluating different elements of masculinity, which includes eleven distinct factors: winning (the desire to be high achieving); emotional control (the idea that men shouldn’t cry); risk taking (being unafraid of a challenge, not willing to back down); pursuit of status (the desire to get money or power); primacy of work (choosing your employment over your interpersonal relationships or your personal well-being); violence (not necessarily a desire to engage in physical or verbal violence, but a sense that violence is sometimes warranted); playboy attitude (a desire for multiple sexual partners); self-reliance (don’t ask for help, figure things out on your own, and don’t let anyone see you sweat); power over women (a sense that men are natural leaders and should be in charge of women); dominance (a desire to be in charge of every situation); and homophobia. Obviously this last one does not translate easily to gay or bisexual men, but many experience internalized homophobia, which is strongly positively correlated with body-image dissatisfaction.

Risak: Are these norms specific to the U.S., or would you say they are relatively universal?

Siegel: I mostly study men in the U.S., but I did some work in Canada as well. We see a little less rigidity in masculine norms in Canada. There are certainly other countries in the world where traditional masculinity is highly prized and rewarded, and men there experience more gender-role stress. For example, men in Greece and Japan score higher on measures of gender-role stress than men in countries like Sweden or the Netherlands. But most of the published research on masculinity focuses on countries that are WEIRD — Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic.

Risak: Why do you think that is?

Siegel: The first reason is that most psychological research is conducted on undergraduate students, because they are cheap and available. Participation in research is often a requirement for undergraduate psychology courses. Another reason is that many of the psychological instruments we use to assess masculinity or body image — such as the Conformity to Masculine Norms Inventory — are developed using WEIRD samples and cannot readily be translated into different cultures or languages.

Risak: Have these norms changed throughout history, or have they remained largely static?

Siegel: Social psychologists have been attempting to assess masculinity only for the last few decades, so it’s hard to say with certainty whether changes have occurred. I do think that, as society evolves and gender relations shift, we see changes in what it means to be a man, particularly when it comes to something like attitudes toward the LGBTQ+ community. We are currently seeing the emergence of more-flexible masculinity among celebrities like Harry Styles. But I’m not convinced that, as a society, we are becoming broadly accepting of men who distance themselves from masculine norms, as traditional masculinity is still prized in a variety of domains, such as the workplace. The emergence and popularity of celebrities and influencers who endorse and promote rigid masculinity ideology, such as Andrew Tate and Jordan Peterson, speaks to the broad appeal of these ideologies today.

Risak: How is the “masculine body” defined?

Siegel: It depends on the person and where they live, but in the U.S. we typically see a mesomorphic ideal: lean, muscular, and with a low body-fat percentage. This is persistent across the U.S. and common in LGBTQ+ communities in particular. Sexual-minority men are at elevated risk for eating disorders due in part to the lean ideal being perpetuated in their communities. I do want to note, though, that there are queer subcultures with totally different body ideals. Gay “bears,” for example, idealize larger, hairier men.

Risak: Why is lean and muscular the ideal?

Siegel: There are evolutionary theories: that such a body type suggests the man is probably fertile, capable of getting resources, and would otherwise be a good fit for sexual reproduction. But as a social psychologist, I hesitate to accept biological or purely evolutionary answers to these questions.

The “tripartite influence model” in social psychology focuses not on where these ideals come from but rather on how they are perpetuated. This model was initially proposed to explain why women experience body-image dissatisfaction, but it has since been expanded to capture men’s experiences. How we decide what our body should look like, and why, traditionally comes from our three primary sources of information: peers, parents, and media. Research on men’s body image has also included a fourth source: romantic and sexual partners. When I teach this to my students, I refer to it as the “four Ps”: peers, parents, porn, and partners. Porn is only one subset of media, of course, but there is quite a bit of research suggesting that increased exposure to sexualized media is a predictor of body-image dissatisfaction in men.

The body-related messages communicated from all these sources reinforce the mesomorphic ideal in a variety of ways. People may experience teasing or bullying from peers if their bodies don’t conform to the ideal. This teasing may be about muscularity or about weight. Parents and partners may make disparaging comments about weight or shape, but these are often cast as concerns. Partners may inadvertently reinforce norms through compliments about bodies. And the media certainly perpetuates the mesomorphic ideal.

We learn from these norms and strive to adhere to them, particularly if we’re someone who fears backlash or makes a lot of social comparisons. We know that people who make more social comparisons about their bodies or eating tend to feel worse about themselves, because they believe they’re failing to measure up to their peers.

Risak: What role do these body ideals play in the dynamic between men and women?

Siegel: Body norms work to reinforce unequal gender dynamics, with many men striving to be big and muscular, and many women striving to be dainty and petite. Within the context of most heterosexual relationships, there’s often a consensual reinforcement of these norms: many women, explicitly or not, communicate that they want to be with muscular or tall guys, and many men communicate that they want to be with curvaceously thin women. The bodies we idealize are representing the structural power difference between women and men. For men, actual physical force is a form of social power, and for women, being physically smaller has the potential to make them reliant on men. Feminist scholars have portrayed the cultural obsession with women’s thinness as a feature of patriarchy that keeps women distracted from their lack of power and diminished social status. It can be hard to focus on your civil rights when you are fixated on your appearance or weight.

We often talk about “toxic masculinity,” but, in reality, masculinity is multifaceted and contains many beautiful elements. It appears in different ways in different cultures and in different eras.

Risak: Have these gender dynamics shifted at all in the wake of the #MeToo movement?

Siegel: I don’t know of a study that provides that sort of information. Since #MeToo just happened in 2017, research is unlikely to have been published yet. I am curious, though. I think we did see an initial impact of #MeToo on policies, procedures, and social attitudes. But, as with all social movements, things tend to regress to the status quo. A pretty clear example of this is Black Lives Matter in 2020: There was initial social momentum toward defunding the police. A few years later we’re seeing that people, cities, and organizations are not following through on the promises they made in 2020. I’m not optimistic that the #MeToo movement will maintain its momentum. I hope it will, but the backlash we have seen to it gives me pause.

Risak: How do social norms of gender affect people who don’t conform to the gender binary or who don’t identify as heterosexual?

Siegel: As a person who is cisgender [individuals whose current gender identity is the same as the sex they were assigned at birth — Ed.] and not actively doing transgender research, I can only try my best to summarize this. To get the best information, you should read the original work being done by Jerel Calzo, Claire Cusack, Scout Silverstein, and Allegra Gordon.

Some statistics suggest that transgender individuals have a two- to four-times-greater risk of eating disorders. One reason is that controlling their bodies can help them pass in a transphobic society: Transgender women can pass more easily if they make their bodies smaller. Trans men can pass more easily if hips and curves are bound or hidden. Being thin can reduce gender dysphoria and help transgender individuals avoid the violence and discrimination that are pervasive in our society. It’s a safety strategy.

There is less research on nonbinary individuals. They can be pulled in either direction — toward masculine body presentation or feminine body presentation — or they might fluctuate in between. It’s hard just to be a person who’s not gendered, because we have such strong gender norms and expectations about what bodies are “supposed” to look like.

Risak: Many fitness influencers recommend exercise routines, diets, and nutritional supplements to help followers achieve an ideal physique. At what point does this type of messaging become problematic?

Siegel: Joyful movement is good for you. Getting your heart rate up is healthy. Getting out and being with your friends while moving can provide a positive social experience. But if you are exercising out of a drive for muscularity or thinness, to alter the appearance of your body rather than the functioning of your body, then you might find yourself trapped in a cycle that puts you at risk for an eating disorder.

There are certainly fitness influencers who promote a healthy relationship with the body, regardless of its size. Jessamyn Stanley, the yoga influencer, is a perfect example. But, more often than not, exercise is portrayed as a way to lose weight and become more attractive. Influencers might also encourage certain eating regimens, such as “bulking and shredding,” that have the potential to contribute to dysregulated eating. Not everyone who engages in rigorous exercise or dysregulated eating patterns will develop an eating disorder, but for people who are susceptible to disordered eating, these fitness regimens can potentially cause harm.

Another somewhat insidious way exercise and fitness influencers can have an adverse effect on people’s well-being is through coded language around health. The relationship between health and weight is far more complicated than we might think. Being thin and losing weight are not necessarily signs of good health, and being fat and gaining weight are not necessarily signs that someone is in poor health. Encouraging people to “get healthy” through weight loss is misguided, unscientific, and, frankly, fatphobic.

Exercise is a dicey subject even among eating-disorder researchers. When we look at the definitions of eating disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), exercise isn’t involved in many of them. Exercise can be listed as a compensatory behavior in diagnosing cases of bulimia nervosa or anorexia nervosa, but some people experience compulsive exercise outside of that.

We are learning more about the complexity of eating disorders, which have long been understood as a female condition associated with the SWAG stereotype — skinny, white, affluent girl — even though eating disorders have been documented in men as far back as the 1600s. These conditions were called “anorexia nervosa” and “bulimia nervosa,” instead of “anorexia hysteria” and “bulimia hysteria,” because men do develop them, and doctors didn’t believe that men could experience hysteria. For long periods in the twentieth century, however, there was a general misconception that eating disorders affected only women, and the diagnostic criteria and treatment options became gendered. Older versions of the DSM, for example, list “amenorrhea” — cessation of a menstrual period for at least three months — as a diagnostic criterion for anorexia nervosa.

In the 1980s more and more men were entering eating-disorder clinics, and they weren’t presenting in the same ways as women were. Although women often develop eating disorders out of a desire for thinness, the masculine norms of dominance, confidence, sexual success, and physical and emotional self-control make men more likely to develop an eating disorder in an attempt to become muscular. So, many men engage in different behaviors to achieve an ideal body, including excessive exercise, regimented eating behaviors, and appearance- and performance-enhancing substance use.

Men now make up 25 to 33 percent of eating-disorder diagnoses. The threatened-masculinity hypothesis of disordered eating posits that one reason why we’re seeing an uptick in muscularity-oriented disordered eating is men’s desire to reestablish dominance in increasingly gender-egalitarian societies.

I suspect that every statistic we have about men with eating disorders is an underrepresentation of the actual number, because it’s not stereotypically masculine to admit to having these conditions.

Risak: What impact does the feminine association with eating disorders have on men?

Siegel: As I mentioned, self-reliance is one characteristic of traditional masculinity. Because of this, men are less likely to seek help for medical and psychological conditions. They’re not expected to have mental-health problems, because that would shatter the ideal of the strong, stoic man. Add a traditionally “feminine” condition like an eating disorder on top of that, and it puts them at risk of being ridiculed as less manly if they acknowledge or seek help for the condition. I’ve heard men express the fear they might be perceived as gay for having these conditions.

I suspect that every statistic we have about men with eating disorders is an underrepresentation of the actual number, because it’s not stereotypically masculine to admit to having these conditions, and it’s definitely not stereotypically masculine to go to a doctor or specialist and get a diagnosis. So it’s difficult to know how many men are really struggling. And since most treatment plans were developed with women in mind, we don’t often see the same level of effectiveness for men who do get into treatment. Traditional elements of masculinity are not addressed in most eating-disorder programs. I think there are some men who might acknowledge they have a problem but who feel they’re not going to get help once they get in the door. More therapists are becoming knowledgeable and sensitive to these issues, however. So if you don’t succeed with the first therapist, don’t give up. Continuing to seek help, even after negative initial experiences, is always recommended.

Two young men seen from the back at an angle stand closely together: one in a tank top with his hand cupped around the back of the other’s neck; one in a T-shirt with his arm around the other’s waist.
© Lloyd Wolf

Risak: Is it possible to recover from an eating disorder, or is it something a person must learn to live with?

Siegel: That’s a debated question. I’m in recovery from an eating disorder: during my early twenties I was in treatment for acute anorexia. And I believe that full recovery is possible. For the last eight years I’ve been researching people living with eating disorders, and there are definitely some who feel the eating disorder is no longer a meaningful or salient part of their life. Many people go on to live very full lives after the initial eating disorder, and symptoms don’t have to be monitored as closely. But there are also people who have chronic eating disorders and experience periods of relapse and remission throughout their lives. I don’t think professionals in the field have taken a definitive stance on whether full recovery is possible for every person with an eating disorder.

Risak: What is “muscle dysmorphia,” and what are its risks?

Siegel: You will often see muscle dysmorphia colloquially referred to as “bigorexia,” but that’s a bit of a misnomer. Muscle dysmorphia is characterized by obsessive thoughts about muscularity, a perception that one is insufficiently muscular, a powerful desire to become more muscular, and repetitive urges and self-surveillance associated with a desire to be muscular. In many instances muscle dysmorphia is associated with excessive exercise; it is important, however, to note that these studies have small sample sizes. One study showed that 90 percent of men who experience muscle dysmorphia have used appearance- or performance-enhancing drugs. That particular study, however, included laxatives as an “appearance- and performance-enhancing drug,” which is a broader categorization than we typically see. Other research has shown that 40 to 50 percent of men diagnosed with muscle dysmorphia have at least experimented with anabolic steroids — to create the appearance of additional muscle mass — and androgenic steroids, to create more traditionally masculine features, like a stronger jawline.

There are various adverse outcomes associated with steroid use, including cardiovascular disease and psychiatric effects such as mood swings, aggression, and violence. Long-term use has also been associated with hypogonadism [when the sex glands produce fewer hormones — Ed.] and neurotoxicity, though this research is still new. Muscle dysmorphia itself can have a host of physical and social consequences, including muscle or joint damage from compulsive exercise, as well as prioritizing exercise over work, social outings, or romantic relationships.

There’s a lot of debate about whether the muscularity-oriented disordered eating associated with muscle dysmorphia should be labeled as a feeding-and-eating disorder, rather than an obsessive-compulsive disorder. Right now, muscle dysmorphia is a specifier for the “body dysmorphic disorder” label in the DSM, which falls under obsessive-compulsive and related disorders. The major diagnostic criteria for muscle dysmorphia focus on compulsive thoughts and “checking” behaviors. People with the disorder may have difficulty being present with others or focusing on the task at hand because they are constantly plagued by thoughts about their body and are consistently monitoring their body. Some research suggests that men with muscle dysmorphia engage in more body-related social comparisons and are more likely to withdraw socially from their peers.

Risak: Research on muscle dysmorphia focuses almost exclusively on white men. Are there studies of the disorder in individuals of other races and gender identities?

Siegel: I don’t have data readily available on the disorder in women, or in nonbinary people. I have seen a few studies that looked at female bodybuilders to determine whether muscle dysmorphia can exist in women. It seems as though it can, but overall more research is needed on women. There is also scant research on the condition in men who are not white. In fact, there is very little research on the body-image experiences of Black men at all.

Risak: What does the absence of research on Black men suggest to you?

Siegel: That the undergraduates who participate in student sample research are mostly white. We’re diversifying our methods in psychology, but convenience sampling is still the most common, even though it is definitely not the most representative of the population. There’s a belief that Black men are shielded from eating disorders and negative body image, but that’s because of flawed methodology. It’s not grounded in reality. One reason why we’re not seeing Black men with eating disorders is because the tools we use to evaluate eating disorders generally aren’t culturally sensitive. Even if Black men are included in research, we’re missing the specific cultural nuances necessary to assess their disordered eating.

The absence of culturally sensitive tools for finding body-image disorders in Black subjects speaks to a larger problem of generally ignoring the experiences of Black people in our research. The field of psychology is only starting to grapple with its structural racism.

Risak: How difficult is it for men suffering from muscle dysmorphia to ask for help?

Siegel: It can be extremely difficult for people with muscle dysmorphia to even recognize they have this condition. There is a normalization of muscularity-oriented disordered eating among men. It’s hard to know where the boundary lies between “gym-bro” culture and a psychological condition. Some men take pride in strictly adhering to specific dietary practices and exercise behaviors that give them a sense of control and enhance their appearance, and they might not recognize this as a problem. Their friends, if they’re also steeped in gym and exercise culture, might be rewarding them socially, and romantic or sexual partners might make positive comments about the size or shape of their body and musculature.

I don’t want to minimize women’s eating disorders — they are very serious; I would know — but one benefit women have is that people, including medical doctors, are more aware of eating disorders and body-image concerns in women. They are more likely to notice behaviors like skipping meals, restricting certain food groups, losing a lot of weight, or bingeing and purging, and they will call them out. A loved one or friend or parent will step in and say, “This isn’t acceptable. We’re going to get you help.” That’s often not the case for men. Because men with big muscles are praised in our society, it can be difficult for people to intervene and say, “Hey, you need to get help for this.”

Risak: What can we do as a society to make treatment a more accessible option for men?

Siegel: We need to take a threefold approach. First, we have to grapple with traditional masculinity and the adverse behaviors associated with it. We have to acknowledge how it hurts men and makes it difficult for them to get the help they need.

Next, we need to figure out how we can create a more expansive, more colorful version of masculinity that allows men to engage in the elements of it that feel right for them — being assertive, being a leader, taking risks — without harming themselves. Author Tony Porter discusses the “man box” of masculinity, suggesting that rigid adherence to traditional masculinity doesn’t allow men to reach their full potential, because there are elements of femininity necessary for them to succeed. Men who are stuck in the man box can’t feel their feelings or be particularly effective communicators. They might not get the help they need for body-image issues, alcohol-use disorder, depression, or anxiety. Men have the potential to be so much more and do so much more good in the world. If we expand our definition of masculinity, we will help society as a whole.

We also need to destigmatize therapy. I recently spoke with Joe Kelly, who has written a series of books about how men can support their children in getting treatment for eating disorders. He uses the language of coaching rather than therapy with men, because they are more receptive to that approach. He helps men understand that getting help doesn’t make them less of a man. We must also address the financial issues, because therapy can be financially out of reach for many.

Ultimately we want men not to need help. We don’t want these problems to exist in the first place. I talked about the tripartite influence model; we have to think about how we as peers, as parents, as partners, and as consumers and producers of media contribute to men’s unrealistic body ideals. We have to stop promoting this mesomorphic ideal as the best a man can be. The best a man can be has nothing to do with what he looks like, but rather with his kindness, his care for others, his passions. We need to stop venerating men who are nice to look at and instead find role models in men who are nice to others.

It’s worth noting that we live in an extremely fatphobic society. Weight stigma is regarded as one of the last socially acceptable forms of prejudice, perpetuated by doctors, peers, nutritionists, fitness influencers, and others. Trying to make your body lean or thin is a natural response to that pressure. If we truly want to change the way people engage with their bodies, we have to fix our weight-stigma problem.

Risak: What are you working on now?

Siegel: I am researching eating disorders in the context of romantic relationships. I have interviewed more than sixty people, including quite a few men and nonbinary people, who are living with and recovering from eating disorders and are also in romantic relationships. So far my research suggests that relationship quality can play a huge role in determining the trajectory of someone’s recovery — or relapse.

There is not much research on how eating disorders affect relationships, and vice versa, and virtually all of it focuses on the experiences of heterosexual couples in which the woman has anorexia. So I sought out a diverse sample regarding diagnosis, gender, sexual orientation, relationship configuration, and age to shed light on elements that were overlooked in past research.

We talk about relationship-related triggers, ways that partners can effectively support those living with eating disorders, and how they fail to do so. We also discuss how eating disorders affect dating, sex, and pregnancy; how partners can create an environment where the person recovering from the eating disorder feels safe, loved, and supported; as well as any fears they may have for the future.

A lot of people I’ve spoken to, including men, feel anxious about discussing their eating disorders or body-image concerns with their partner, but I consistently find that people who have not disclosed their eating disorder to their romantic partner feel ashamed or embarrassed, as if they had something to hide, whereas people who have disclosed these things feel closer to their partner. They can be more honest. They don’t have to pretend that everything is OK. And their partner can then be more sensitive to their concerns.

Risak: We’re two women discussing issues regarding men’s bodies. If the situation were reversed, it would likely be seen as problematic.

Siegel: Problematic is a word that I try to avoid, because it’s nonspecific and gets thrown around a lot. I think there is room for both lived expertise and research expertise. But deliberately choosing to interview a man about women’s experiences of their bodies could be perceived as overlooking the numerous female experts in this field.

In this context, we are two women discussing men’s body image, and you absolutely could have spoken to a man about this. I don’t have the experience of living in a man’s body, but I have interviewed many men about their bodies. I speak to men about their bodies and body image every single day. Anyone who feels I am providing a partial perspective should speak to the men in their lives about their bodies. I would prefer that. This discussion is a great starting point, but the most important thing people can do is normalize conversations about body image.

There’s a moment that comes to mind: Years ago I was doing a study about how men experience eating disorders in the workplace, and how the workplace can serve as either a barrier or a bridge to recovery for them. One man made a point that has stuck with me. He said, “There’s no script for men to talk about their bodies.” And I think that is right on. He struggled for words throughout the interview because, he said, he’d never been asked about this before, even though he was living with a clinically significant eating disorder.

So go talk to the men in your life. Get the full story from them.

Risak: For a researcher who studies the harmful effects of traditional masculinity, you present men in a mostly positive light.

Siegel: I call myself a capital-F Feminist, and a lot of people, when they speak to me, think I’m going to say, “We just have to get rid of the men; then all of our problems will be solved!” But I’ve seen the best of men. I have witnessed them leverage their power to support women and LGBTQ+ colleagues. I recognize that men are under tremendous pressure to perform traditional masculinity, and they could use our support. I also live with my incredible male partner. He’s a man I enjoy quite a lot. He is the best of men.

Patriarchy is the problem, not men. At the end of the day, patriarchal norms and expectations hurt us all. We need to promote authenticity and reduce the need to adhere to traditional masculine or feminine norms. If we do that, everybody wins.